


# Radicals and Socialism

By  
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# RADICALS AND SOCIALISM

*Peter Hain and Simon Hebditch*

## *Introduction*

Socialism in Britain is under siege. Many battles which seemed to have been won, now have to be re-fought: witness the attacks on the welfare state and civil liberties, and current celebration of the mythology of free enterprise. Within the media there has been an orchestrated smearing of the socialist creed, going well beyond a traditional anti-Labour bias, as commentators and intellectuals have defected to the Tories. It is now almost impossible to get a fair hearing for socialism, with political debate degenerating into a series of strident clichés directed at trade unionists and at the left.

In part this is a predictable response to the potentially radical brand of socialism contained in Labour's Programme. In part it is the frightened response of the privileged to the growing power of trade unionism. In part it is a product of the economic crisis which the right is using to fan people's fears and insecurities.

But we believe there are serious failings on the left as well, and that the socialist case is being allowed to go by default. As individuals who have been members of the Labour Party only since September 1977 – and previously active in the Young Liberals for ten years – it may be felt that it is presumptuous of us to pronounce on the future of socialism. But we hope that this pamphlet will strengthen the labour movement and help arrest the slide to the right in public debate.

If the pamphlet contains a central theme, it is that a commitment to “decentralised socialism” is required in order once more to capture the imagination of working people and make possible a far-reaching transformation of society – but that this will only be possible if a re-alignment of the left occurs to parallel the current re-grouping of the centre and to challenge the growing menace of the right.

We would like to take this opportunity of thanking the many individuals who have welcomed us so warmly to the ranks of the Labour Party, especially Neil Kinnock, Tony Benn, Joan Lester, Dick Clements, Tom Jackson, members of Putney CLP and the Institute for Workers' Control who invited us to write the pamphlet.

## *The 'Alternative Politics'*

Some Labour members find it difficult to accept that radical activists or committed socialists can be genuine in their commitment and yet remain outside the Labour Party. This view is, we believe, based upon a somewhat self-righteous complacency which can only weaken the labour movement. For instance, it is not good enough to be dismissive of the political generation which, especially in the mid-to-late 1960s, has chosen to work outside the Party.

Labour is still suffering from the alienation of that generation, beginning at the height of CND and accelerating after the Wilson Government came to power.

Whether over Vietnam, Rhodesia or attacks on trade union rights, the 1964-70 Labour Governments behaved little better than nicer versions of Conservative administrations.

Feeling betrayed, many progressive people – especially young activists – looked elsewhere for a vehicle for serious change, and found political homes that offered more to them than a sterile confrontation between two seemingly conservative Parties.

Some concentrated their energies in single-issue movements, such as the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign and the Stop The Seventy Tour Campaign. Aside from their particular achievements, campaigns like these provided a positive alternative to more conventional forms of politics. Concrete results could be achieved and the imaginative and militant style of action inspired an enthusiasm which could not be expressed through the labour movement.

The new activists also began to organise in working class communities, through squatting projects and community action. Whereas the protest movements were largely middle class, activity at the neighbourhood level brought in working class people also estranged from the political system.

New 'politicised' charities and welfare agencies sprang up during the 1960s, absorbing the energies of many young people.

And Trotskyite groups enjoyed a boom period, especially in the universities – the International Marxist Group and the International Socialists (now SWP) being the main beneficiaries. It was a sign of the times that the Communist Party did not benefit from this fresh socialist impetus and indeed its membership continued to decline. This was partly because the so-called 'New Left' that grew up in Europe, the USA and, in a milder form, in Britain, was as opposed to Stalinism as it was to capitalism. It was also partly because the CP seemed incapable of responding to the radicalism of the new politics, appearing more comfortable with traditionalist and conservative styles of activity.

Finally, some activists joined the Young Liberals, particularly during the 1966-8 period. We both joined in 1967, at a time when it was the most politically active youth movement, especially on international questions, and its imaginative campaigning style brought in many ex-Labour Party Young Socialists.

A 'libertarian socialist' ideology dominated the YLs at that time. There was an anarchist influence in, for example, the YL movement's commitment to direct action and to workers' control – but also a more conventional socialist input through support for public ownership and democratic planning. The YL's aim was to turn the Liberal Party from a quasi-conservative body into a base for a re-alignment of the left in British politics, bringing the fragmented activity generated by the 'New Left' movements within a political party that had a recognised public platform.

The wider 'New Left' movement reached its zenith with the revolt in Paris in May 1968. That eruption was initiated by students influenced by anarchists and 'situationists', and helped by the brutal reactions of the French riot police; but its revolutionary potential existed in the link that developed with workers: the general strike coupled with widespread factory occupations constituted the real threat to de Gaulle's regime.

Elsewhere however – in Britain, West Germany and the USA – there were no links of any substance between the New Left movements and workers organisations. This was a major reason why, by the early 1970s, these movements had run out of steam, the ‘youth revolt’ had petered out and pressure groups had entered a period of retrenchment. A deepening economic crisis coupled with the absence of connections with working class politics led many activists to re-examine their role.

Nevertheless the heritage of that period remains. There was a resurgence in support for mass participation and direct democracy – in the workplace, the neighbourhood, in education. A trenchant critique of conventional party politics emerged. But perhaps the most significant legacy was a revival in support for direct action and for the primacy of extra-parliamentary pressure in bringing about change.

### *Libertarian Socialism*

Although the New Left movements lacked a cohesive ideology, the general perspective adopted was one which may be termed ‘libertarian socialism’. This was especially true of the movement in the USA, with groups such as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) developing a programme based upon communal ownership and control of resources and backed up by libertarian values and strategies. Admittedly, the term lacks precision and has no strong tradition in Britain. But it is a definite historic strand in socialist thought which some have argued the New Left merely revived and applied to contemporary conditions.

Libertarian socialists believe that the Marxist method has much to offer in its analysis of capitalism and its insistence on the decisive importance of both economic forces and class. But the New Left itself was a reaction against the old Marxist left. The doctrinaire and mechanistic excesses of Marxism, as well as its spurious claim to ‘scientific’ status, demands a credible socialist alternative. In addition, the abject authoritarianism of many Marxists is quite unacceptable to those of us for whom the attraction of socialism lies in its ability genuinely to liberate mankind. Many a rallying slogan of the New Left echoed the old anarchist antagonism expressed by Bakunin in 1872:

Marx is an authoritarian and centralizing communist. He wants what we want, the complete triumph of economic and social equality. But he wants it in the state and through the state’s power, through the dictatorship of a . . . despotic provisional government, that is by the negation of liberty . . . We want the reconstruction of society and the unification of mankind to be achieved, not from above downwards by any sort of authority, nor by socialist officials, engineers, and other accredited men of learning – but from below upwards, by the free federation of all kinds of workers’ associations liberated from the yoke of the state.

The libertarian socialist tradition can be traced back to Robert Owen – some would say, even earlier to the Levellers and the Diggers. In Europe, its roots are stronger. Perhaps the most prominent advocate was Peter Kropotkin, the Russian anarchist. He insisted that it was not sufficient to replace capitalism with what he called ‘authoritarian socialism’, arguing that state ownership and control of all land and capital would “create a new tyranny even more terrible than the old one” since it would simply transform private capitalism into what he called “state capitalism”. By contrast, under libertarian socialism, society would be based upon the principle of community self-management, with ownership vested at community level and

rewards based upon need and not performance. This meant the replacement of the state as a centrally coercive body, with associations and communes which would federate upwards on a free basis for the purposes of mutual aid and mutual co-operation.

Kropotkin also stressed that the absorption of all social functions by the state leads to the "development of an unbridled narrow-minded individualism" which should be antithetical to the socialist instinct. As the individual's obligations to the state increase, he is drawn away from his personal obligations to his fellow citizens and loses a slice of his humanity in the process. Consequently society becomes alienated from the individual. Such tendencies can be seen, 80 years after Kropotkin wrote, in the modern welfare state. Because they are organised on such a hierarchical and bureaucratic basis, the social services can make people totally dependent upon the state apparatus — which is why it is essential to move towards democratic local control of publicly provided services and resources.

We do not suggest that Kropotkin's libertarian socialism can be transposed straight into modern industrial society — although some modern writers (notably Noam Chomsky) have made a case for this — but, instead, that the labour movement ought to draw on this tradition in proposing a decentralised socialist programme. It is important to dispel the myth that socialism automatically implies a harsh and regimented control of people's lives by a soulless state machine. Indeed, we must assert that socialism positively encourages diversity, spontaneity and freedom.

We can learn from Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who has inspired a concept of 'African socialism' based upon self-reliance, and who stresses in his writings that there are many different approaches to socialism.

We should, for instance, take account of the 'Eurocommunism' phenomenon. Although the only experience we have of communist parties is that they establish oppressive regimes which prostitute socialist ideals and extinguish liberty, the pluralist and democratic assumptions in, for example, the writing of Santiago Carillo and the latest 'British Road to Socialism' produced by the British CP, raise key issues. It is quite possible that, as Eric Heffer has argued, eurocommunism may help to create a "regenerated socialist movement in Europe".

Moreover, when revolts against the state have occurred in Eastern Europe, the rebels have argued, not for a return to capitalism but for the establishment of genuine workers control and democracy on a 'libertarian socialist' basis. The uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 have important lessons for us.

### *Liberal Party*

The Young Liberals' promotion of 'community politics' also owed much to such decentralised socialist ideas. It represents a style of political action through which people gain first the confidence to agitate for their rights and second the ability to control their own destinies. It also involves a willingness to take direct action, being essentially an alternative form of politics, bursting out from within the community and involving people in the experience of taking and using power on their own behalf and on their community's behalf.

From the beginning, however, there was a major division in the radical Liberal camp between those (mainly Young Liberals) who wanted a militant, confrontation-

ist strategy, and those who believed that the priority was to get the Liberal Party officially to adapt itself to the community politics idea, even at the cost of compromising on its militant and socialist basis.

Thus it was, in the aftermath of a dismal performance in the 1970 General Election, that the Liberal Assembly in Eastbourne was faced with a resolution committing the Party to a 'community politics' strategy. The resolution was passed after the radicals had persuaded rank and file delegates, against strong advice from the establishment. But to some, it seemed at the time a pyrrhic victory. In order to win over delegates it was moved on the basis that it meant more vigorous and committed local activity, such as lively newsheets and the promotion of local involvement on community issues. The ideological roots of the idea were deliberately played down, as were any notions of militant action.

We were amongst those radicals who believed that this was a mistake and, in retrospect, can claim justification for our position. What happened was that the Liberal Party embraced the community politics concept as an extension of what the more active and imaginative local Parties had been doing all along. As it took off, it became identified with pure electioneering techniques. And, in the atmosphere of intense disillusionment with the major Parties in 1972-4, it led to a series of astonishing by-election victories. Sutton and Cheam – a safe Tory seat – fell as the Liberals catapulted from a poor third to a 7000 vote majority. Labour majorities in Chester-le-Street and Manchester Exchange were slashed, the Liberals won control of Liverpool and took local council seats all over the country, especially in areas where 'community politics' techniques had been employed.

Most commentators merely passed this off as another Liberal revival in the style of Orpington in 1962; and there are undoubted affinities between the two – in particular, a Tory Government discredited amongst even its own supporters. But this ignores the fact that the use of community politics techniques attracted support in working class and suburban areas alike, the breadth of which surpassed the early 1960s and almost carried the Liberals over the magic vote barrier which meant the difference between a dozen and over a hundred seats.

Amidst all the euphoria, however, some uncomfortable facts were staring Party radicals in the face. Sections of the Party used community politics as an electoral gimmick. The Party leadership adopted it grudgingly – and then only because the press identified it as one of the sources of electoral success in such terms as 'capitalising on local discontent over dustbins and broken pavements'. Above all, however, it became identified with a middle road strategy, ducking class issues and exploiting justified political disillusionment on a purely populist basis. The whole concept as originally advanced by the YLs was finally corrupted in the February 1974 General Election which the Liberals fought on an all-things-to-all-men platform of 'moderation'. Since then the radicalism that had been injected during the 'Red Guard' Young Liberal phase of 1966-8 and subsequently carried through by YL activists has been in rapid retreat, and we found it impossible honestly to remain members.

A particular reason for our resignation and progression to Labour was that the 'radicals' in the Party have been consistently selling out. This went back to the disagreement over the 1970 Assembly motion. Basically, those who adopted our view then have since drifted out of the Party, and the radical and Young Liberal

wing has become anti-ideological and by default reverted to a brand of Liberalism that is certainly aggressive and uncompromising on civil liberty issues, but which has no real affinity with socialism. This trend accelerated after 1974 when the YLM recruited members, not for the reasons we joined but because they actually believed in the platform of 'moderation' projected by the Party's leaders.

In the context of a growing economic crisis which has sharpened the divisions and contradictions embedded in the structure of British society, this 'radicalism' has simply become a populist smokescreen behind which the Party leadership and the majority of members have been lurching rightwards. Hostility to trade unions has become increasingly shrill. By 1977 the Party Assembly had adopted a position condemning all forms of the closed shop which was even to the right of the Tory Party!

The right wing roots of the Liberal Party have now asserted themselves, with former Young Liberal heroes like Jo Grimond — who had publicly flirted with syndicalism in 1968 — adopting a *Daily Express* posture of simplistic and strident anti-socialism, ludicrously equating public ownership with Stalinism and trade unions with the Gulag. Reflecting feeling within the Party's membership, Grimond argues that individual liberties are more threatened by socialists than Tories, that a Liberal/Tory alliance may be preferable to the Lib-Lab Pact, and has even tacitly supported the National Association for Freedom.

Recently, the British Liberal Party became part of a European Liberal Federation that includes hard right wing elements and soft Tories such as the French Giscardiens; and that has adopted a reactionary common programme to fight the European direct elections. Although the radicals in the Party fought this alliance when it was first proposed, they have now acquiesced in its implementation.

Finally, the Liberal Party has adopted a clear coalitionist strategy. The origins of this were apparent in the 1973-74 period when the opinion polls showed that a substantial Liberal parliamentary representation was on the cards, and with it a situation in which the Party would hold the balance of power. Jeremy Thorpe came closer than many people realised to accepting a coalition offer from the defeated Edward Heath, and under David Steel's leadership, the Liberals embarked on a strategy dependent upon obtaining the balance of power in successive 'hung' Parliaments, until one or other of the major Parties is forced into a formal coalition. The Liberals also hope that this strategy will provoke a split in the Labour Party, with Labour's right hiving off to form a reconstituted 'social democratic' party in the centre. Indeed, the basis upon which David Steel entered into the Pact — "to stop socialism" — was specifically calculated to encourage such a development.

The Lib-Lab pact was made in March 1977 as the first step — the second would be an informal coalition and the third a fully fledged coalition. It is probably an "all-or-nothing" strategy for if it does not come off the Party is likely to lose all credibility as a distinctive and independent force. But it does fit neatly into the modern Liberal approach of rational centrism, based on the belief that if everyone gets around the table and behaves like a gentleman, then class divisions will melt away, industrial strife will end at a stroke, and 'sanity' will prevail.

It is a view associated with the proposal for a 'government of national unity' under which the Parties would 'sink their differences' and pull together to 'save



the nation'. Besides being essentially fraudulent in that it proposes no *programme* of solutions to the deep problems facing Britain, it provides a convenient mask for the right. Anybody who has studied the National Government formed under Ramsey MacDonald in 1931 will know that it was not truly 'national' at all, but a Tory Government in disguise. As David Marquand, MacDonald's biographer, records, the National Government campaigned during the 1931 election for support "not on the grounds that it had new solutions to the country's problems, but on the grounds that it existed: and that its existence had saved the country once and would go on saving it in the future". That platform was as specious then as is Liberal coalitionism now: although the Liberal Party has plenty of policies it has no programme for change, no real solutions to the economic problems facing us.

And if the word 'radical' means anything at all, it surely means a recognition of the fact that, in a society as polarised as Britain's by class divisions and power inequalities, political change will only occur through the politics of real choice and not through the anti-politics of consensus. The Liberal Party's decisive move towards permanent coalition politics represents the complete antithesis of real choice and therefore offers no hope of progressive change.

We have dwelt on the Liberal Party at some length, not to indulge in a ritual knocking exercise, but to explain why we think it is untenable for radicals to remain within it. It is important to argue this because there are many Party activists who wish to see it playing a radical role, challenging the political establishment of which Labour when in office is regrettably part. This is an admirable aim but one which it is simply not credible to claim can be advanced through the Liberal Party.

Even on civil liberty issues, the Liberals have repeatedly procrastinated. For example, the Liberal MPs refused to oppose the deportations of Philip Agee and Mark Hosenball. And, although many of our former colleagues have smugly reminded us that it was a Labour Government which instituted the deportations, what they chose to ignore is that if the Liberal Party – outside government, with nothing to lose, and not in the pocket of the security services and the civil servants who promoted the deportations – could not be persuaded to fight on the issue, then one might as well join the labour movement and fight within it. After all, the main opposition to the deportations came from *within* the labour movement. We could give numerous other cases, including the Official Secrets Act and the new Criminal Law Act, where the Liberal Party has either been indifferent or reactionary on basic issues of individual liberty, and where members of the labour movement have given a lead.

Whereas in the late 1960s and early 1970s radicals could claim some justification for working within the Liberal Party, economic recession has exposed its fundamental shortcomings: an inability to face up to class divisions; the lack of an industrial base; and an historic commitment to private capital and private property.

### *Re-alignments*

British politics has entered a state of flux. That much is obvious from the defections of the more effete Labour right wingers and the chorus of calls for a regrouping of the centre. Not enough attention has, however, been given to trends within radical politics that may produce a re-alignment on the left which could rejuvenate the labour movement.

We have referred to the events which encouraged a generation of activists to choose protest politics or community action in preference to the labour movement, which would have been their natural home in earlier decades. The result was the emergence of what was termed – perhaps over-ambitiously – as “the alternative politics”: community groups, claimants unions, women’s liberation, black groups, third world solidarity campaigns, environmentalists, radical professionals, the ‘counter culture’, to name the principal ones. Although they represented a diffuse movement without a cohesive ideology, they shared a common outlook: a rejection of capitalist society, an eschewing of conventional politics, a willingness to take direct action, an imaginative campaigning style and, above all, a philosophy based on grass roots organising and the involvement of the maximum number of people in taking control over their lives. Most important in the context of this pamphlet, they sought to replace the Labour Party with a new popular socialist movement.

The groups constituting the ‘alternative politics’ grew out of the late 1960s and probably reached the peak of their power in the early 1970s. Since then however they have tended to drift and the ensuing unease has led to a re-assessment of strategy and, indeed, the basic foundations of their politics. There are a number of reasons for this but the major two are probably the lack of resources available to such groups and their failure to develop a coherent political perspective.

Taking the resources issue first, it is almost self evident that the political muscle possessed by community or protest groups depends ultimately upon *action*: either on an ability to cause embarrassment through attracting publicity; or an ability to be obstructive, through taking direct action and harassing the authorities. This reliance on *action* as a power base can be highly effective in the short term, while it retains an element of novelty and surprise. But it neglects the question of *resources* which are necessary to sustain the struggle and control over which ultimately dictates the spread of power. Lacking access to tangible resources, many community groups have tended to experience a period of frenetic activity followed by a state of semi or actual collapse, with their chief activists exhausted and disillusioned.

To overcome this problem they have taken grants from trusts, central government, or from local authorities – which places them in the dilemma of accepting funds from the very authorities they are in theory seeking to undermine and to replace. The crucial problem is thereby sidestepped rather than solved. Some of the more pragmatic activists have been content to accept dependence upon external finance by the state as an inevitable ‘fact of life’. But for others, notably those more conscious of the ideological and political objectives of community action and protest, it has been a ‘crunch’ issue and has led to a search for a broader political strategy into which community action could fit.

Whichever of these two views was supported, the fact remains that the cosier relationship with national or (more usually) local government now enjoyed by many groups has encouraged a piecemeal approach to community organising and a return to a traditional pressure group role, lobbying quietly in the corridors of power. In short, there has been a retreat from an open, confrontationist style of campaigning and from a visible ideological posture, to a more down-to-earth approach concerned with detailed day-to-day problems. Such an approach may achieve more to alleviate specific or short term problems, but is at the expense of

developing a political consciousness to challenge the existing order.

The second major reason behind the tendency of many community groups and national pressure bodies to act almost as social technicians, making the welfare state work more efficiently, has been the failure to establish a definite political strategy. This is not to plead for the doctrinaire excesses of the splinter-parties. It is merely to assert that the absorption of many groups as appendages to the welfare state rather than alternatives to it, can be explained partly by the absence of a clear theory of social change through protest, pressure and community action. There has also been a failure to reconcile the somewhat amorphous notion of 'community' with the reality of class and power divisions which militate against unity within and between communities.

For those who set their sights lower and confine their advocacy of pressure politics to the argument that it enables the successful promotion of a single cause, for their activities. But for those who genuinely sought an 'alternative politics' — in the literal sense of taking direct action and creating 'counter-institutions' which could eventually supersede the existing system — the experience of the recent past has been disappointing.

For example, the material emerging from the Home Office-sponsored Community Development Projects, set up for five-year periods from 1969 onwards, suggests that little can be achieved by official community work processes beyond the most marginal improvements. The CDP workers have for the most part concluded that such community initiatives must be firmly linked to a broader political struggle through the labour movement if any real change in the distribution of power and resources is to occur. The significance of these conclusions is underlined by the fact that they flowed out of projects initiated and funded by the Government

Moreover, as the 1970s have unfolded, the 'new groups' referred to earlier have been unable to ward off attacks on their rights. They have either been defended inadequately when under fire from the state (for example, the threat to squatters produced by the 1977 criminal trespass law) or have had in practice to depend upon sections of the Labour Party (for example, moves to restrict abortion which were fought most actively by certain Labour MPs).

Just as the trade unions set up the Labour Party to defend their interests, so many of the new groups are today being forced to look to Labour for their defence. This has also led to a greater acceptance of a 'dual approach' of working both inside and outside the political system. While committed to the primacy of extra-parliamentary action, we believe that it is necessary to work within the system as well.

First, the platform provided by that system cannot be ignored: although it does not inspire much commitment from ordinary people, it does relate to the population in a way that fringe groups do not; many such groups (notwithstanding their rhetoric about 'acting at the grass roots') in reality have little connection with the majority of people.

Second, although 'revolutionary' and 'reformist' strategies are often posed as contradictory — and in practice have normally been so — there is no real reason why this should be the case in a society such as Britain's. In any event, most self-styled revolutionary parties engage in struggles which have as their *immediate* objective demands that can be accommodated within the system — for example, most

strikes. If they did not engage in such struggles, these groups would not relate in any way to ordinary people. It is the political perspective within which these struggles are waged, rather than the actual demands themselves, which makes them revolutionary. We need to start where we are — not where we would like to be, and this means fighting on those issues which are in the hearts and minds of working people and posing a series of transitional demands, not embarking on a grand design with impeccable theoretical credentials but no practical relevance to day-to-day life.

To refuse to work within the system means a rejection of short term changes, which we find morally and politically unacceptable. It is not good enough to argue that people's immediate needs should be ignored, nor can there be any justification for the tendency of revolutionary left groups to regard individuals as pawns to be manipulated and (if needs be) sacrificed for some millennial revolutionary objective. A serious socialist strategy must alleviate deprivation and misery *now* and simultaneously prepare for the basic changes that can eliminate the structure and the conditions which create deprivation.

Consequently, many radical activists have come to accept the necessity both for a socialist programme and for working within trade unions. However, it is important for the labour movement to understand what this means. It does not imply a rejection of the politics of direct action and it is most emphatically not a meek return to the conventional political fold. Instead it is a vigorous re-assertion of the primacy of extra-parliamentary action whilst simultaneously recognising the need to work through the Labour Party. In short, it implies an acceptance of the best traditions of the labour movement and equally a desire to change its direction.

The switch back to the Labour Party has been encouraged by other developments on the left. In 1968 and for several years afterwards, the splinter-groups enjoyed a membership bonanza amongst young socialists disillusioned with Labour but committed to the route of building a working class party. However, the sectarianism and self-indulgence of these groups has led to a phenomenal turnover rate in membership. Moreover, the splinter-groups constantly resort to the ephemera of 'instant' politics, which may have a masturbatory value for their largely middle class members, but simply accentuates an elitist remoteness from the mass of working people. Not the least important criticism is that their rigid discipline and intolerance breeds an authoritarianism that denies socialist values of justice and freedom.

But recruits from that quarter will not be satisfied with a meek-and-mild brand of social democracy. Their energy and commitment will express itself in a determination to strengthen the extra-parliamentary wing of the labour movement and intervene actively on issues such as Grunwick or racism.

### *Labour Party*

A switch back to Labour has also been encouraged by internal changes in the Party. In vivid contrast to the 1960s the left is strong within the Party organisation (although this has still to be reflected in the Party leadership and the policies of the Government). From the adoption of the 1973 Programme onwards, there has been

a steady consolidation of what amounts to a far-reaching policy for a socialist transformation.

More specifically, the increased support for workers control suggests that the Party has rediscovered a socialist soul which many thought had been lost for good in the 1960s. This has manifested itself in various ways: the lead provided by the IWC and Tony Benn, support amongst *Tribune* MPs, the work of Stuart Holland and, even more significant, shop floor initiatives such as worker cooperatives or the Lucas Aerospace Combine Committee's 'alternative plan'. The debate over workers' control is now being advanced in a practical way within the labour movement and those who claim a commitment to the principle have to prove that they are not merely pontificating from their armchairs if they still refuse to join the Labour Party. We used ourselves to argue — as many Young Liberals and others on the left still argue — that genuine workers' control of industry would only occur by direct intervention at shop floor level, outside the orthodox institutions of the working class. But, while plausible in theory, it became apparent to us that this argument does not hold up in practice. Lacking any links with workers' organisations the groups who continue to argue in that way end up shouting from the sidelines. 'Workers' control' then becomes simply a slogan or at best a theme for a studious essay in an obscure journal.

This is not to disagree with the necessity for direct action in industry, especially where the official trade unions are not prepared to provide the leadership and industrial muscle required, as happened over the Grunwick strike. We believe that capitalism will only be overthrown by mobilising workers at rank and file level. But to pretend that this can be done from outside the labour movement is to ignore political and industrial realities.

Considerable attention has been given to declining Labour Party membership figures; to the alienation of young people (confirmed by an investigation in 1977 by the Prime Minister's office); to the drop in Labour's share of the vote in 1974 to the lowest figure in the post-War period, and to a falling off of working class participation in the Party. The left normally argues that these alarming trends are due to a failure when in Government to implement socialist policies. But this is only half the story. Until the other half is acknowledged — and something done to change it — then Labour is unlikely to express its full political potential.

However unreal it may seem to Labour activists facing the wrath of big business and the right, the Party is to a large extent viewed by the public as part of the 'establishment'. It has after all been in government for 17 out of the 32 years since the War. In many urban localities it has quite literally become the establishment (and a corrupt one, too, in several areas). It also appears to many outside to be over-bureaucratic, hierarchical and ageing. This may be unfair, but it is the basic image received by the population, principally because of the *style* of politics practised by the Party. In common with the other major Parties, it is essentially an elitist style: Labour has become a vote-gathering organisation rather than a focus for ideological allegiance and cultural identity.

Labour has failed to disengage from this hackneyed system of parliamentary and town hall politics which is so remote from the people. Consequently, the Party is firmly identified with the conventional system. The real position for a socialist

party in a capitalist society must surely be to challenge that system — even when in government: the nominal occupancy of elective office does not alter the fact that real power lies outside, among capitalists, bureaucrats and technocrats. Therefore Labour faces an immediate challenge to evolve a political strategy under which the pursuit of office is not subordinated to the prime necessity to build a mass extra-parliamentary base; we shall return to this theme later.

The weaknesses pinpointed in Labour's politics reflect a wider failure of social democracy. It is *social democracy's* failure which has invited a renewed intellectual and political onslaught from the right. Social democracy is in essence welfare capitalism. It stands for a bureaucratic welfare state, a dose of *ad hoc* nationalisation, equal opportunities (as opposed to the socialist concept of equal power and resources), and, of course, the present hierarchical political structure. Since the War, whatever Party in power, we have had a similar form of social democratic government. Only comparatively recently has the electorate been offered a real choice, with the Tories lurching to the right and the Labour Party programme — not to be confused with that of the current minority Labour Government — becoming far more radical.

Socialism is now being falsely blamed for social democracy's basic shortcomings: an inability to change society, to achieve economic progress or to break the class system that is endemic to capitalism. Above all, social democracy is vulnerable to attack for perpetuating a top-heavy political system that has little to do with socialism and everything to do with trying to manage an obsolete system of capitalism.

By its identification with social democracy the Labour Party invites crude charges from right-wingers of being the 'new establishment', and Labour spokesmen increasingly find themselves in the position of apologising for a system they do not really control. We do not find such apologies convincing; indeed they are positively harmful.

Take for example the problem of bureaucracy. Ordinary people are quite right to be up in arms about the bureaucratic maze they are forced to fight their way through in order to obtain the welfare benefits to which they are entitled, the housing transfer they need, or the tax rebate due to them. It is vital for the labour movement to acknowledge openly that the welfare system as presently organised can be oppressive — especially to poor people who do not have either the confidence or the resources to persistently push for their rights — and to demand fundamental changes. Otherwise the whole socialist principle of the welfare society will be discredited, and we shall continue to concede ground to the populist right. It needs to be asserted vigorously that socialism is about liberating the people, not trapping them in a grey and dwarfing industrialism. The response to the Friedmanite right must therefore be: 'Yes, people are entitled to be angry about the operations of the public bureaucracies, but the solution is not to opt for the jungle of private hospitalisation, education, or insurance, it is to decentralise the social services and place them firmly under democratic community control.'

Current Labour reaction to people, sometimes prominent, who have attacked bureaucratic tendencies is often facile and inadequate, reinforcing a public impression that the Party stands for the centralised authoritarianism of the status quo. This gives a green light to Thatcherism — to the specious glorification of the 'little

man' by a Party of monopoly capitalism that in reality seeks to control and exploit the individual.

It is crucial that the Labour Party leads — and is *seen* to be leading — the struggle to advance personal liberty. Socialism is, above all, about liberty. It always has been. It grew out of the systematic denial of liberty to the working class and, today, socialists are to the fore of campaigns against attacks on liberty — for example, racism or the denial of freedom to workers to form a union.

To counter the 'laissez faire' notion of individualism inherent in the right-wing bandwagon rolling through the media, it is important to assert an alternative notion: that of the individual 'in community'. This is the only one compatible with social justice. For Thatcherite individualism is directly linked to free market economics in which the prize goes to the strong individual and the weakest go to the wall. It is based on the illusion that the classical liberalism of the last century can be resuscitated by 'getting government off the backs of the people'. This would be idle romanticism if it were not also dishonest. For the vast majority of people there was no freedom in the last century: the 'golden age' of liberalism was an age of grinding poverty in which company and land owners ruled with an iron fist.

To enjoy real freedom the individual requires the power to escape the shackles of economic manipulations and the resources to enjoy opportunities to extend his personality. But this will be realised only when the individual is able to experience with others the cooperative process of controlling his destiny and that of the community to which he belongs. To summarise, therefore: individual liberty will only be achieved for the mass of people (as opposed to the minority who have always possessed it by virtue of their ownership of the country's wealth) in an egalitarian society.

That implies, not a centralised 'state socialist' society, but a decentralised socialist society in which an equal distribution of resources underpins individual liberty and enables each person to reach his full potential as a human being.

Whether David Owen had quite this in mind when, in November, 1977, he called for greater decentralisation and individual participation, we rather doubt. He was right to remind us of the careful attempt by the Party's critics to paint socialists as stiflers of individualism, breeders of bureaucracy and obsessed with state control. But — despite laudable references to community cooperation, workers' democracy and decentralised decision making — the real character of his 'decentralised socialism' was revealed by his timid prescriptions: devolution was praised as an example of participatory democracy together with self-assessment of income tax!

Dr Owen's treatment of the issue reflects other decentralisation proposals increasingly coming from social democrats, whether through participation in planning, in the social services, in consumer affairs, or through neighbourhood councils and devolution. All of these may appear admirable attempts to decentralise political power. But none would in themselves challenge the existing hierarchical parliamentary system in any way. Logically extended as in current Liberal Party policy they would simply result in a *dispersal* of political power down through various additional tiers of government, as may be found under the American federal system which nobody could accuse of being a participatory utopia. What matters is the nature of decentralisation and whether or not it redistributes power direct to local communi-

ties and factories, as opposed to local institutions which merely reflect the elitist national system and act as buffers between the people and the ruling class.

There must also be decentralisation of resources in order to create the background of egalitarianism without which 'participation' is a sham. Significantly, social democrats who advocate participation do not advocate workers' control, still less public ownership. Neither are they prepared to countenance the direct action without which any redistribution of power or wealth can only be cosmetic.

It is perhaps no coincidence that social democracy's sudden interest in participation should have come at a time when it is abundantly clear that traditional methods are rendering Britain ungovernable. It is no longer sufficient to operate on the basis of government by edict — however electorally democratic the mandate may be. Whether in the field of economic policy or social services, the complex interdependence of modern society coupled with the power of trade unions and pressure groups, has meant that government is being forced actively to fashion a positive basis of consent and legitimacy for its policies. A prime example is the use of the 'social contract' to combat inflation. Another is the attempt to improve the delivery of services by co-opting consumer or welfare groups.

Viewed in this way, moves by government to involve groups in the decision-making process are desperate attempts to dam up the running tide of ungovernability by *mobilising* specific sectors of society to support its policies. Such pseudo participation does not re-distribute power, but is a therapeutic technique of the state. And it is not confined to participation in industry and in the neighbourhood. One interpretation of the 1975 EEC referendum and the proposed devolution referenda is that they provide a means of getting government out of the hot seat by offloading controversial decisions onto the population and, in the process, placating dissent.

Therefore we need to adopt a healthy scepticism toward the renewed support for decentralisation and to examine closely the ideological motivation for it: a basis for a radical socialist alternative to centralised capitalism, or a device for prolonging the life of an increasingly rickety capitalist structure?

The latter certainly appears the dominant motive in many of the 'worker participation' proposals which have become all the rage: they have been advanced in order to provide a bridge between capitalist and worker rather than to abolish capitalism.

### *Workers' Control*

Which brings us back to the necessity for workers' control. Here again, socialism is being blamed when it has not even been tried. Low productivity, under-investment, lack of incentives, etc. etc. are ills which the right is desperately trying to lay at Labour's door. In reality, it is British capitalists who have failed so abjectly to invest in productive enterprises and who have, instead, either exported their capital, indulged in Slater Walker type manipulation of shares and asset stripping, or put their money into property and land speculation. In reality, also, it is only through workers' control with different forms of public ownership to suit different levels of industry — national, community or cooperative — that workers will be able to



reap the full rewards of their labour, and thereby enjoy the incentives about which so much is heard but which can never be provided fairly under a system such as we have which siphons off rewards into the hands of a privileged class.

Even those socialists sceptical of industrial democracy must concede that 'free collective bargaining' has not significantly shifted the distribution of income and wealth to workers. This is because traditional working class struggles have invariably been either economistic (i.e. demands for better wages and conditions) or defensive (against redundancies or public expenditure cuts): lacking a workers' control strategy, they have not been able to transform the *power* structure of industry, which is a prerequisite to establishing a socialist society.

Genuine workers' control can obviously only operate effectively at shop floor level and, since any socialist must begin from the premise that every worker ought to have the ability to control the productive process of which he is part, the focus for workers' control is clearly at the local level. A socialist society that is not based on this principle will not be 'socialist' in anything except a nominal respect. We need to create socialism from the bottom upwards. It can neither be handed down benevolently from the top, nor can it be imposed on the population by a Party elite.

The beginning should be the demand for "opening the books" which was the call of bodies such as the Institute for Workers' Control in the 1960s, and which has since been taken up by the whole trade union movement and partially expressed in the disclosure of information clauses in the 1974 Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, the 1975 Industry Act and the 1975 Employment Protection Act.

Parallel to this factory-based demand for more information has come the move towards planning agreements. As originally conceived (and advanced in Labour's Programme 1973), they had the radical potential of enabling trade unions to advance industrial democracy at local level and assisting government to take control of the economy nationally. They thus affected a synthesis between workers' control and democratic planning, and in practice invited the build up of trade union pressure without which neither of these principles can be brought about. The fact that the planning agreements proposal was watered down in the 1975 Industry Act indicates the extent to which the Labour Government has abandoned its manifesto commitments, and does not negate the concept. Planning agreements have not failed: they have not been tried.

The twin advocacy of workers' control and democratic planning by socialist theorists such as Stuart Holland, Michael Barratt Brown and Tony Benn provides a basis for reconciling the local and national pulls of a socialist industrial democracy. But democratic socialists must openly acknowledge the dilemmas and possible contradictions of such a reconciliation. It is certainly incumbent upon the 'decentralised socialist' school to deal with the apparent conflict between extending local democratic control on the one hand and, on the other, taking control of the national economy. We fully endorse public ownership and control of industry and of the financial institutions, for without this it will not be possible to distribute resources equally nor to end the squandering of resources that occurs under capitalism. There is also clearly a need for a national framework for an egalitarian society: national minimum wage, provision of social

services, comprehensive education, etc. But within this framework the control of resources must be decentralised and democratically controlled. This marriage of workers' control and national planning is the key issue for modern socialism. As Walter Kendall has written:

“State ownership and economic planning do not of themselves create socialism. Socialism demands working class control over the productive process . . . Total planning and workers' control are incompatible . . . Democratic workers' control of production is incompatible with undemocratic control of planning.”

However, we do not see this potential contradiction being resolved in theory. It can only be resolved in *practice*. Admittedly, we have the examples of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to draw upon — although their brevity makes it difficult to establish firm lessons. We have the example of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia — although authoritarian Party control, the growing influence of market forces and the threat to ordinary workers' power posed by technocrats, may tell us more about the problems than the solutions.

We also have the examples of worker co-operatives established in Spain during the revolution of 1936-38. When the Spanish civil war broke out, farm labourers started taking over farms, villagers started governing themselves and workers occupied factories, with the anarchist trade unions (the CNT and the FAI) playing a crucial role. Villages established common pools of goods along the lines advocated by Kropotkin, and elected their own economic management committees. There was also an element of redistribution of resources between village collectives. The movement for industrial self-management was especially strong in the anarchist stronghold of Catalonia, with all factories having more than 100 workers being socialised and placed under the direction of elected management committees which appointed managers to whom powers were delegated. In addition, a government controller was appointed to each management committee, resulting in a form of joint management with the Catalonian Government. The management committees were subject to recall by a general meeting of the workers, or by the general council of a particular branch of the industry. This general council consisted of representatives from the different management committees, trade unions and technicians, and planned the work and the division of profits. To overcome the problem of the disparity between rich and poor collectives, a 'central equalisation fund' was set up to distribute resources fairly.

The programme of self management set up during the revolution worked fairly successfully, especially in the public services. But it suffered from a shortage of working capital because, under the influence of the Republican Government, credit and foreign trade was still in the private sector. In the end of course this experiment in workers' control was crushed by the Communist Party together with its reactionary allies then in the Government.

The importance of the Spanish experience is not so much that it provides anything approaching a blueprint applicable to the modern, highly industrialised state of Britain. Clearly it does not. The importance is that it underlines the necessity for organisation at the base of society and of *direct* workers' control, rather than Bullock-type half measures.

More immediate relevance can be obtained from the writings of the guild social-

ists, especially G.D.H. Cole. Although we would have major reservations about guild socialism, Cole did begin to get to grips with the twin themes of workers' control and democratic planning, when he argued for a system "by which the control of industry might be shared between the organisations of producers and consumers, so as to safeguard the interests of the community of consumers and at the same time give the workers freedom to organise production for themselves." Of particular interest to this pamphlet is Cole's distinction between his belief in *decentralisation*; the anarchist/syndicalist belief in *federation* (i.e. power delegated from below); and the *centralisation* of state socialists. Decentralisation, he argued, sees the system in national terms and so avoids the pitfalls of anarchists. But, he stated, "it is the essence of the Guild idea that it means government from below" and he saw workers' control developing through "the pressure of trade unionism assuming control from below".

This brings us back to the present. Rank and file trade union action must be the focus for the achievement of workers' control, and we have in the British experience in the 1970s — especially workers' occupations and workers' co-operatives — the beginnings of this process. Linked to wider militancy and the example of schemes such as the Lucas Aerospace Combine Committee's 'alternative plan' for socially useful production, a formidable movement could be created.

If such a movement were further linked to Labour Government policies which positively promoted conditions favourable to workers' control struggles, then the basis of a viable strategy for change could emerge. At a very minimum, public funds should only be made available to industries which are under workers' control, so that any ailing capitalist enterprise seeking assistance will only obtain it if control is handed over to the workers concerned.

This must be linked to an economic programme which brings a speedy return to full employment. Massive state investment is needed in both the public sector and labour intensive industry. But we believe that the conventional labour movement cry for more investment in the manufacturing sector can be misguided. Conventional economic growth actually reduces capacity for full employment because the technology it requires reduces the need for jobs and concentrates the ownership of capital in fewer hands. Only an expansion of the public sector can produce sufficient jobs — and then only if coupled with a reduction in the working week. It is therefore essential that the revenues from North Sea Oil are not frittered away in tax cuts and a short-lived, import-led consumer bonanza, but that they are channelled into the public sector, with a specific priority given to energy-saving projects. Furthermore, it is vital to promote forms of technology that are neither capital intensive, nor destroy the environment and deplete precious resources.

But fundamental change will never be achieved by a simple re-arrangement of structures from on high. Without mobilising ordinary people to take power for themselves — over their industries, their neighbourhoods and their educational institutions — there is no possibility of radical socialist change. Of course, we must strike for the 'commanding heights' of the economy, and change will be necessary at the level of state organisation (public ownership of financial institutions being just one example). But unless this is underpinned by concerted and active pressure from below, it is highly unlikely that we should ever succeed in such a strike and

even more unlikely that the result will be worthwhile! It is no good grafting a socialist facade onto a structure of power and authority that prevents people from determining their destinies. Unless workers have participated in the experiences of first confronting and then replacing the existing capitalist system, then any change that occurs will hardly be worth having.

### *Strategy*

Equally important is the need for the labour movement to adopt a different style of politics and to thereby encourage a re-alignment of the left.

We have argued that it is wrong to follow current fashion in saying that politics is 'in decline'. Judged by membership figures, activity levels and voter commitment, *party* politics is unquestionably in decline — and understandably so. (For instance, since 1951 when the Labour and Tory Parties between them accounted for 97 per cent of the votes, this had fallen to 89 per cent by 1970 and to 75 per cent by October 1974 when only 50 per cent of the registered electorate actually supported them.)

But there is considerably more to politics than competition between conventional Parties. Almost in tandem with their decline has been the rise of pressure group politics, community action and the 'alternative' groups referred to above. Not all of this has been progressive of course and, in recent times, the right has shown an appetite for exploiting the pressure group scene: Mary Whitehouse's lobby and the National Association for Freedom must by any standards rate amongst the most successful of pressure groups. However, the general movement has been very far from reactionary. In deprived areas, a local community group, rather than a Labour Council, has often been responsible for fighting bad housing conditions, and single issue campaigns have frequently achieved far more than would have been possible through traditional political channels.

The real challenge for Labour, therefore, is to transform its role so that the energies of the 'alternative' groups can be harnessed to an industrial and electoral thrust which could build sufficient mass support to confront and replace the existing capitalist system.

What does this mean in practical terms? First, that Labour must commit itself to a more open participatory strategy. Second, that local pressure groups should enjoy representative status in local Labour Parties and national ones on the NEC and through conference, just as do the unions. Third, that, when in power, Labour governments (national and local) must not resist direct pressure and activism of a socialist nature from outside the system, but must actually welcome it. For, without such pressure, the fundamental changes we desire will not be possible. Just as mass trade union militancy in the country was the only force which could conceivably have resisted the pressure for cuts in public expenditure from the Treasury and the IMF in 1976, so the active mobilisation of grass roots support on local issues will enable Labour councils to implement socialist policies rather than modified Tory ones which usually emerge from the administrative structure.

For example, instead of prosecuting squatters, Labour councils should encourage family squatting in order to make the best use of available empty property (public and private) and to build up the momentum for decent housing policies. Similarly,

links between the labour movement and tenants' associations can extend the struggle for tenants' control and encourage the setting up of tenants' cooperatives.

The ideological justification for such an extension of the labour movement also rests upon an understanding of the development of modern politics. As has been stated, Parties are undoubtedly in decline. Parliament enjoys less and less power, as it surrenders its authority to outside interest groups and semi-public institutions. The welfare state has spawned a new area of politics: claimants unions, consumer groups, community groups, information and advice groups. As a result, we are rapidly approaching a situation of political 'stalemate' in which it is difficult to fashion the broad public interest out of the range of competing interest groups. The only way that this can be done whilst still retaining a socialist impetus is to bring the progressive groups within the ambit of the labour movement.

Many of these groups, in turn, require the political representation which the trade unions achieved by establishing the Labour Party at the start of the century. This is especially true of the various minorities — such as Blacks, the homeless, disabled, gypsies — who, together with the inner city poor, and low paid non-unionised workers, constitute what has almost become an 'underclass'.

The underclass is below the organised working class and excluded from the benefits of the closed system of modern politics that is based upon bargaining between interest groups. For the underclass groups, wages are only half the problem — and maybe not even as much as that if they are also unemployed. They come into harshest contact with the system through bad housing, hostile police, inadequate social security, health, schools and community facilities. It is in these areas that conflict for such groups is most intense, rather than in the workplace, and a strategy for radical change which ignores this is irrelevant to their needs.

However, it is important not to interpret this argument of ours as a plea for the co-optation of otherwise troublesome forces which disturb the tranquility of the Westminster Club — a plea for what Marcuse called "repressive tolerance". An argument along these lines could be — and possibly will be — propagated as part of the general corporatist drift of modern government, evidenced by the incorporation of the national trade union leadership into the policy making process. But our argument brooks no compromise with corporatism. It is based upon a desire to strengthen the base of the socialist movement.

Indeed, it is essential that the strategy of 'economism' pursued almost exclusively by the trade union movement broadens out to embrace, not only political campaigns like the one against racism, but community struggles as well. As Jack Munday, secretary of the Australian Building Labourers' Federation put it,

"A union should intervene in all issues affecting the worker. It's no good fighting for the welfare of the worker during his 40 hours of work if other people are going to destroy all the other hours of his week."

The New South Wales Branch of the Federation has been especially active in using its muscle to stop the destruction of working class communities for developers' profit, demonstrating the potential of trade union/community action links. Other examples have included the 1915 Clyde Rent strike when threats of industrial action by munitions workers stopped a planned rent increase. Today, as community activists increasingly see the necessity for working with trade unions,

alliances are being built — for instance, the ‘Green Bans’ campaign on environmentally undesirable projects in Birmingham. But the as yet fragmented and tentative initiatives need to be better coordinated.

The impetus to do so will be increased by the example of the Lucas Aerospace workers who have campaigned for the right to work on socially useful technologies. As a Young Fabian study of their campaign has argued:

“Faced with recession many workers are finding that they need to go further than just ‘defending jobs’ at the point of production, and that they must seek to influence longer term corporate policy concerning product choice . . . particularly if at the same time they can see many social needs that are not being met and which their skills could be used to satisfy.”

The implications of this are not only an extension of collective bargaining beyond economism, but a link with community action so that community and social needs can be given prominence in workers’ struggles.

The labour movement should also be prepared actively to endorse direct action — that is to say, forms of action which, though non-violent, are *obstructive* — as opposed to more symbolic forms of activity such as marches which seek to persuade *by example*. The history of the trade union movement from Tolpuddle onwards proves that significant victories have been achieved only after resorting to direct action. Grunwick is a salutary reminder of the shortcomings of relying upon the law and official channels.

The historical restriction of the extra-parliamentary dimension of the labour movement to narrowly industrial organisations was presumably because of the *parliamentary* orientation of the movement: it led to a strict demarcation between the political and the industrial. With community issues (as opposed to industrial issues) being restricted to the Labour Party’s province, it was consequently not seen as necessary to create an extra-parliamentary base in the community to mirror the unions in the factory.

In our view this shortcoming is one of the major reasons preventing Labour from bringing about the socialist transformation that the Party’s policies imply. We would accept the traditional view on the left of the Party that there is a need to establish an authentically socialist leadership and would fully endorse initiatives such as the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy. But this view assumes that change *within* the Labour Party holds the key to socialist progress, whereas we believe it to be just one strand of a broader strategy. The major priority must be to establish working links between the Party and the rank and file socialist movement outside, based initially on various political, community and industrial alliances of the kind suggested earlier in this pamphlet, and leading to a realignment of the left around a rejuvenated Labour Party.

Given such a strategy, the many thousands of activists at present frustrated by the insular alternatives available, could be attracted into the labour movement.

If allied to a decentralised socialism programme, exciting possibilities would open up, particularly against the background of persistent economic crisis. Radical socialists should not see the current crisis as a time for retreat, for postponement of demands for revolutionary change until times are easier. Socialism cannot wait to be built upon some temporary success of capitalism. On the contrary, the crisis provides the very opportunity and indeed necessity to introduce socialism now.

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